Game Theory: Rationality and Equilibrium in Strategic Interaction
(1993, NS 88)
Partha Dasgupta, Karl-Göran Mäler, Jörgen Weibull and others
June 18-20, Björkborn Manor, Karlskoga
Proceedings: E Kalai: Special issue of the journal Games and Economics Behavior, vol. 8, no. 1, January 1995,
Academic Press, Inc., USA

ISSN 0899-8256
   
Table of Contents  
Editor's Note
Ehud Kalai		 1
INTRODUCTION
Nobel Symposium on Game Theory: Rationality and Equilibrium in Strategic Interaction
Brian Skyrms		 3
SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES
Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality
Robert J. Aumann		 6
Learning in Extensive-Form Games. I. Self-Confirming Equilibria
Drew Fudenberg and David M. Kreps		 20
Learning To Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game
John Gale, Kenneth G. Binmore, and Larry Samuelson		 56
A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Complete Information
John C. Harsanyi		 91
Subjective Games and Equilibria
Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer		 123
Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term
Alvin E. Roth and Ido Erev		 164
An Axiomatic Theory of a Risk Dominance Measure for Bipolar Games with Linear Incentives
Reinhard Selten		 213
REVIEWS AND COMMENTS
The 50th Anniversary of TGEB
Willaim F. Lucas		 264
ANNOUNCEMENT 269

 

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